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David Chaum, Peter Y A Ryan, Steve Schneider
Abstract. We present an election scheme designed to allow voters to
verify that their vote is accurately included in the tabulation. The scheme
provides a high degree of transparency whilst ensuring the secrecy of
votes. Assurance is derived from close auditing of all the steps of the
vote recording and counting process with minimal dependence on the sys-
tem components. Thus, assurance arises from verification of the election
rather than having to place trust in the correct behaviour of components
of the voting system.
1 Introduction
Since the dawn of democracy, it has been recognised that the process of recording
and counting votes would be the target of attempts at corruption. The Ancient
Greeks investigated the use technological devices to provide trustworthy voting
systems and avoid the need to trust voting officials, [1]. The challenge is to
provide voters complete confidence that their vote will be accurately recorded
and counted whilst at the same time guaranteeing the secrecy of their vote.
Most traditional approaches to this problem involve placing significant trust
in the technology, mechanisms or processes. Thus, for the traditional paper bal-
lot, the handling of the ballot boxes and counting process must be trusted, that
the boxes are not lost or manipulated and that the counting process is accurate.
Various observers can be introduced to the process which helps to spread the
dependence but does not eliminate it.
With many of the touch screen, DRE, devices widely used in the recent US
presidential elections, the voter at best gets some form of acknowledgement of
the way they cast their vote. After that, they can only hope that their vote will
be accurately included in the final tally.
2 Voter-verifiability
By contrast, in [3], Chaum presents a digital voting scheme that enables voter
verification, i.e., provides each voter with the means to assure themselves that
their vote has been accurately included in the vote tally. This scheme combines
a number of cryptographic techniques and primitives to provide a high degree
of transparency whilst at the same time preserving ballot secrecy. Rather than
having to place trust in the components to perform correctly, steps of the vote
recording and tallying process are closely monitored to detect any malfunction
or corruption.
The key elements of the Chaum approach are:
– provide the voter with a receipt showing their vote in encrypted form.
– enable the voter to confirm in the booth that her intended vote is correctly
encoded in the receipt, whilst preventing the vote from being revealed outside
the booth.
– have a number of tellers perform an anonymising mix on the batch of en-
crypted ballot receipts with all intermediate steps of the tellers processing
posted to the web bulletin board.
– perform random checks on all steps of the process to ensure that, with high
probability, any attempt to corrupt the vote capture and counting will be
detected.
The point of the encrypted receipt is to provide the voter with a way to check
that her ballot is entered into the tallying process and indeed, if her receipt has
not been included, to prove this to a third party. The fact that her vote is in
encrypted form ensures that there is no way for her to prove to a third party
which way she voted. Voters can visit the web bulletin board and check that their
(encrypted) ballot receipt has been correctly posted. The tellers process these
posted receipts and there are mechanisms in place to ensure that all posted
receipts are entered into the tallying process.
The anonymising mixes performed by the tellers ensure that there is no link
between the encrypted ballot receipt and the decrypted version that is finally
output by the tallying process.
3 Preˆt a` Voter
The original scheme of [3] uses visual cryptography to encrypt the receipts and
perform the decryption in the booth. The scheme presented here uses a more
conventional representation of the vote, i.e., ballot forms with the candidates or
voting options listed in one column, and the voter choices entered in an adjacent
column. As a result, we believe that the scheme is easier to understand and
implement.
In accordance with the design philosophy of minimising trust in components,
it is essential that the decryption process in the booth be transparent and not
depend on the intercession of any hardware or software devices, as these might
be susceptible to failure or corruption.
An earlier paper, [6], introduced the idea of encoding the vote in terms of
two aligned strips, one carrying the candidate or option list in randomised order
(independent for each ballot form) whilst the other strip carries the voter choice.
There, the voter was invited to choose between the two strips and to retain one
as the receipt. This introduced a certain asymmetry with both cryptographic
and psychological implications.
In this paper we introduce some further innovations: we use ballot forms that
are generated and printed in advance. As before, these have two columns, one
of which shows the candidate list in scrambled order. Now however, rather than
choosing between columns as previously, the voter makes their choice between
the two forms. They will always discard the column containing the candidate list,
and submit the column containing the marked vote. This avoids the asymmetry
in the choice between left and right columns of the previous scheme.
A further innovation is to use the tellers in an oracle mode to enable the
checks on the well-formedness of the ballot forms. This is in addition to the usual
use of the tellers to perform the anonymising mix during the tallying phase.
Besides allowing independent auditing authorities to perform random checks,
this also opens up the possibility of various checking modes, including enabling
the voters to cast a dummy vote and have the tellers return the decryption to
them as a check on the construction of the ballot forms.
The scheme presented here provides a number of appealing aspects, notably:
– Voters will find the vote casting process quite familiar.
– Cryptographic commitments are generated before voter choices are known.
– Voter checks on the correct construction of the ballot forms are supplemented
by random audits. Thus, voters are able to contribute to the verification
of the vote capture process but we are not dependent on the voters being
sufficiently diligent.
– Checks on the correct construction of the ballot forms are performed before
votes are cast. This simplifies the recovery strategies.
– The vote recording devices in the booth do not learn the voters’ choices.
This neatly avoids any threats of such devices leaking the voters’ choices.
– The scheme is conceptually much simpler than others that have been pro-
posed. This increases the chance of voter acceptance.
– The current scheme shows considerable flexibility, suggesting that it could
readily be adapted to different electoral requirements.
4 The Election Setup
A number of tellers are appointed. Each is assigned or creates two secret/public
key pairs. These public keys are publicised and certified.
An authority creates a large number of ballot forms, significantly more than
required for the electorate. These will have a familiar appearance: a left hand
column listing the candidates or options and a right hand column into which the
voter can insert her selection. This might just be an X in one cell for a single
choice election or a ranking for a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system. Thus,
for a four candidate race, a typical ballot form might look like:
Nihilist
Buddhist
Anarchist
Alchemist
onion
However, the order in which the candidates are listed will be randomised
for each ballot, that is, far any given ballot, the order candidate order shown
should be totally unpredictable. The onion contains the information allowing the
ordering to be reconstructed, buried cryptographically under the public keys of
the tellers. The precise construction of the onions will be described in Section 7.2.
The exact details of the voting procedure can be varied according to the de-
tails of the election and according to the perceived nature of threats to which
the system is exposed. For simplicity of presentation we outline one simple pro-
cedure. Others procedures are possible and indeed one of the advantages of this
scheme is that it appears to be significantly more flexible than previous variants.
We suppose then that a suitable authority has generated and distributed
a large number of printed ballot forms to the polling stations. In the spirit of
the design philosophy described earlier we do not wish to place any trust in
this authority to generate the forms correctly. Rather, independent auditors will
be appointed whose task is to subject a random sampling of these ballots to
well-formedness checks. These checks are designed to establish that the seeds
buried cryptographically in the onions correctly correspond to the candidate
list that appears on the form. We will describe details of these checks once
the construction of the onions has been presented. The auditors might also be
tasked with checking that the entropy used in the creation of the ballot forms is
sufficiently random.
Further random audits could also be performed during the election. Indeed,
once the election has closed, leftover forms could all be routinely audited as well.
In addition to these audits, the voters are also able to perform some checks of
their own, as detailed shortly. Thus, the voters are empowered to contribute to
the verification of the election.
5 An Example
The scheme is best introduced by way of a simple example. We will give a more
formal description later. We suppose for simplicity of presentation that we are
dealing with a simple election system in which each voter selects exactly one
candidate. This allows us to give the example using just cyclic shifts of the
candidate ordering. Generalisations to deal with options to select more than one
candidate or to rank them etc. are straightforward and discussed later. Clearly,
a “none of the above” option could also be included.
5.1 Processing votes
Suppose that there are four candidates and these are given a base ordering:
Anarchist
Alchemist
Nihilist
Buddhist
Since we are considering only cyclic shifts in this example, there are four
possible candidate lists. These will be numbered from 0 to 3 according to the
offset from the base candidate list. Ballot forms will be generated with random
offsets as described in detail later.
For convenience of the mathematical manipulations later, we will adopt a
numbering convention for the candidates from 0 to 3 as indicated. Thus a vote
for Anarchist will be encoded as 0, for Alchemist as 1 etc. This numerical rep-
resentation is purely for the machine manipulations and need not trouble the
voter.
Consider the following ballot form:
Buddhist
Anarchist
Alchemist
Nihilist
Qqkr3c
This has an offset of 1. Thus the onion—Qqkr3c—encodes the value 1. Sup-
pose the system is to process a vote for Nihilist. This would be represented by a
mark in the Nihilist box:
Buddhist
Anarchist
Alchemist
Nihilist X
Qqkr3c
Once the voter has marked their choice, the left hand column that shows the
candidate ordering is detached and destroyed, to leave a ballot receipt of the
form:
X
Qqkr3c
Such right hand strips showing the position of a X and an onion value con-
stitute the ballot receipts.
This is now fed into the voting device, presumably an optical reader, which
transmits the information on the strip, the position of the X (as a numerical
value 0, 1, 2 or 3) and the value of the onion, to the tellers. The tellers use their
secret keys to perform the decryption of the onion (see later), and provide the
decrypted vote value corresponding to the vote in the base ordering. In this case
the process yields the offset 1, so the vote value is the position of the vote (3)
with the appropriate offset removed, yielding candidate 3− 1 = 2: Nihilist. This
process is illustrated in Figure 1. A more detailed description will be provided
later.
Nihilist
Nihilist
Anarchist
Anarchist Alchemist
Alchemist
Buddhist
Buddhist
X
X
Tellers
Qqkr3c
LH strip RH strip processed
RH strip
base ordering
Fig. 1. Processing a vote
5.2 Introducing the Voter
Our voter, Anne, first authenticates herself and registers at the polling station.
She is invited to select, at random, a pair of ballot forms. Of these, she will
choose one with which to cast her vote. The other will be used for a simple
check to test the veracity of the onions and the vote extraction process, after
which it can be discarded.
6 Checking the construction of the ballot forms
The novel technique of using the tellers as an oracle during the voting phase
suggests a number of possible modes for checking the correct construction of the
ballot forms:
1. Single dummy vote.
2. Multiple or ranked dummy vote.
3. Given the onion value, the tellers return the candidate ordering.
4. Return the seed and run a checking algorithm for the well-formedness.
Of these, the last is the most rigorous and the most appropriate for the
auditing authorities. Any of the first three seem more suitable for the voters to
perform.
In the first, Anne would cast a dummy vote in exactly the same way that
she will later cast her real vote in the booth. Thus, she could put a cross against
a random selection and send the receipt off to the tellers. They decrypt the
onion and return what they believe was the vote cast. If the onion was correctly
constructed, this should of course agree with the dummy vote Anne selected.
Psychologically this is an interesting possibility: assuming that the check
succeeds, it should provide the voter with some assurance that when they come
to cast their real vote, it will also be correctly counted. On the other hand it
might undermine their confidence that the secrecy of their vote will be assured.
It should also be noted that the single dummy vote provides a rather weak
check on the ballot form construction, checking only part of the construction.
The second modes seeks to rectify this: by allowing the voter to cast several
dummy votes, either in series of in parallel by making a ranking selection. In
the later case, given the receipt, the tellers should return what they believe to
be the candidate ranking chosen by the voter. This provides a more complete
check on the construction of the ballot form. Both of these suffer the drawback
that the voter is expected to make random choices. People are notoriously bad
at making random choices.
The third mode is perhaps the most satisfactory. It provides a complete check
on the ballot form but does not require the voter to make any random selections.
Here, given the onion value, the tellers should return what they believe to be
the candidate ordering as shown on the ballot form.
We note that the first three modes are vulnerable to collusion attacks. If
the authority that generated the forms is in collusion with one of the tellers
there is the possibility of corrupting forms without detection by these modes.
For example, the authority could flip a pair of candidates on the ballot forms.
The colluding teller performs the corresponding flip during the checking phase,
but not during the tallying phase.
The last checking mode is not vulnerable to such collusions and so is more
rigorous. It therefore appears to be most suitable for the auditing authorities. It
could also be made available to voters, but it seems less intuitive and so perhaps
less reassuring to the voters. Investigating the psychological aspects of these
checking modes from a voter perspective will be investigated in future work.
We stress that all the checks detailed here serve purely to probe the well-
formedness of the ballot forms, i.e., serve to detect any failure of the candidate
orderings on the forms to correspond to the information buried in the onions.
These checks do not provide any detection of corruption during the tallying
phase. For this we have quite different mechanisms that will be presented shortly.
Assuming that the checks go through okay, Anne can proceed to the booth
with her ”real” ballot form. If any check fails, Anne should notify an official who
should then investigate and diagnose the source of the error. We will discuss the
error handling and recovery strategies later.
6.1 Casting the vote
Suppose that the check on Anne’s test vote succeeded. This provides confidence
that the ballot forms have been correctly constructed and hence that onion on
her real ballot form also corresponds correctly to the offset of the candidate list.
Anne now enters a booth with her “real” ballot form. She marks her X in the
usual way. Suppose that she decides to vote for the “Buddhist” candidate:
Nihilist
Buddhist X
Anarchist
Alchemist
e1rg38
She now removes the left hand strip (for shredding), and feeds the right hand
strip into the voting device, which reads the position of Anne’s X , and the value
of the onion. The device then returns the right hand strip to Anne for her to
retain as the ballot receipt.
X
e1rg38
Note that the vote recording device will not learn which way Anne voted. Its
role is merely to read the information on Anne’s receipt and relay it to the the
tellers via the web bulletin board. This is a significant advantage of this scheme
over earlier ones in which the voting device necessarily learnt the voter’s choice,
which raises the possibility that the device could somehow leak this information.
The device transmits its digital record of the receipt to a central server for
subsequent posting to the web bulletin board once the election has closed. Anne
will later be able to visit the bulletin board and confirm that her receipt is cor-
rectly posted and hence that it is correctly entered into the tallying process.
The tallying process is deliberately constructed to hide the link between spe-
cific ballot receipts and the resulting decrypted votes, in order to provide voter
anonymity. Thus Anne cannot directly link her input vote strip to any specific
resulting vote, and so she cannot directly verify that her vote has been correctly
decrypted. However, the fact that the votes are all correctly processed can be
checked to a high degree of confidence, provides Anne with the assurance that
her vote will be decrypted correctly.
Observe that Anne’s receipt alone does not reveal which way she voted.
Unless the tellers are involved, this can only be determined if the left hand
strip (now destroyed), that carries the candidate ordering, is aligned against it.
Only the totality of the tellers, acting in consort, using their collection of secret
keys are able to extract the seed information and so reconstruct the candidate
ordering for that ballot form.
7 Construction of the Ballot Forms
The above description should have provided the reader with the key intuition.
We now give some of the mathematical details.
7.1 Construction of the Cryptographic Seeds and Offsets
For each ballot form, the authority will generate a unique, random seed. If there
are k tellers (numbered 0 to k − 1), this seed will be made up of a sequence of
2k values that we will call the germs:
seed := g0, g1, g2 . . . g2k−1
Each of these germs should be drawn from some modest size field, perhaps
232. Thus, for k = 3 say, the seed values will then range over 2192. These numbers
can be adjusted to achieve whatever cryptographic strength is required.
The offset for the candidate list is now calculated from these germ values as
follows. First a publically known cryptographic hash function is applied to each
of the germs and the result taken modulo v, where v is the size of the candidate
list:
di := hash(gi) (mod v) i = 0, 1, 2, ....., 2k − 1
The cyclic offset θ that will be applied to the candidate list on this form is
now computed as the (mod v) sum of these values:
θ :=
∑2k−1
i=0 di(mod v)
7.2 Construction of the Onions
In order to facilitate auditing of the tellers while preserving anonymity of the
voters (see [3] or [2] for more details), each teller performs two Chaum mixes and,
accordingly, has two independent secret/public key pairs assigned to it. Teller i
will have public keys PKT2i and PKT2i+1 , and corresponding secret keys. The
onion is formed by nested encryption of the germs under these public keys, and
is given by:
{g2k−1, {g2k−2, {. . . , {g1, {g0, D0}PKT0}PKT1 . . .}PKT2k−3}PKT2k−2 }PKT2k−1
We introduce a little more notation to denote the intermediate layers of the
onions. D0 will be a random, nonce-like value, unique to each onion. The further
layers are defined as follows:
Di+1 := {gi, Di}PKTi
Onion := D2k
The construction of an onion is pictured in Figure 2.
8 The Role of the Tellers
The primary role of the tellers is to perform an anonymising mix and decryption
on the batch of encrypted ballot receipts posted to the web bulletin board. This
g0g1g2g2k−2g2k−1
PKT0
PKT1
PKT2
PKT2k−2
PKT2k−1
D2k D2k−1 D3 D2 D1
D0. . . . . .
Fig. 2. An onion
ensures that the decrypted votes that emerge at the end of mix cannot be linked
back to the encrypted receipts that are input to the process. Aside from some
minor differences, the role of the tellers and the auditors are essentially as in the
Chaum original. For completeness we give a brief overview here. More detailed
descriptions can be found in [3] or [2].
The first, left hand column, of the bulletin board shows the receipts in exactly
the same form as the printed receipts held by the voters. The voters can check
this column to verify that their receipt has been accurately posted. An easy
way to do this would be to search on the string representing the onion value
and check that the X appears in the correct box, i.e., as shown on the voter’s
receipt.
The information in the first, left hand column of the bulletin board is then
passed to the first teller, Tellerk−1, for processing. There is no shuffling of the
information when it is passed to the teller. The position of the X on the voting
slip is encoded as an integer r, and the correctness of this encoding can be simply
and publically verified.
The tellers will subsequently manipulate the numerical representations of the
receipts, i.e., pairs of the form (ri, Di), where ri is an element of Zv and Di is
an ith level onion. The initial value of r2k is the encoding of the position of the
X as originally placed by Anne on her receipt.
Each column (apart from the first, which contains the actual receipts) shows
only the simplified, digital representation: a pair (r2k, D2k) consisting of a value
r from Zv and the value D of the onion layer.
Each teller accepts an input column of votes (r,D) from the previous teller,
and then carries out two manipulations, to produce a middle column of votes
and an output column of votes. The output column produced by the teller is
then passed to the next teller in the chain.
Thus for each of the (r2i, D2i) pairs in the batch in the input column,
Telleri−1 will:
TelleriTelleri+1 Telleri−1
Fig. 3. A teller
– apply its first secret key, SKT2i−1 to strip off the outer layer of the onion
D2i to reveal the enclosed germ g2i−1 and the enclosed onion D2i−1.
g2i−1, D2i−1 = {D2i}SKT2i−1
– apply the hash function to the germ value and take the result (mod v) to
recover d2i−1:
d2i−1 = hash(g2i−1) (mod v)
– subtract d2i−1 from r2i (mod v) to obtain a new r value r2i−1:
r2i−1 = r2i − d2i−1 (mod v)
– form the new pair (r2i−1, D2i−1)
Having completed these transformations on all the pairs in the initial batch
as posted in its input column, it applies a secret permutation to all the resulting
pairs and posts the resulting permuted pairs to its middle column on the bulletin
board.
Telleri−1 now repeats this process on the contents of the middle column
using its second secret key, SKT2i−2 to obtain a new set of (r2i−2, D2i−2) pairs.
It will apply a second secret shuffle, independent of the previous one, to this
batch of new pairs. The resulting transformed and shuffled (r2i−2, D2i−2) pairs
are now posted to the output column on the bulletin board, and passed on to
the next teller, Telleri−2. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.
This process is repeated by all the tellers in sequence, as illustrated in Figure 4
for a sequence of three tellers. The value of any of the intermediate r values is
thus given by:
r2k−i = r2k −Σij=1d2k−i (mod v)
Teller2 Teller1 Teller0
votesballots
Fig. 4. Three tellers anonymising mix
When the last teller performs the final transformation it outputs a batch of
pairs which comprise a final r value r0 and the inner onion value D0. The final
r0 values are the values of the original votes in the canonical, base ordering.
Figure 5 illustrates the effect of the process on a single vote.
To see this, observe that the candidate list on each form is shifted by the
(mod v) sum of the d values, i.e., θ. Thus the initial r value is the candidate
value plus θ modulo v. For each ballot pair, the tellers will have subtracted out
the d values from the initial r value, thus cancelling the original shift of the
candidate list and so recovering the original candidate value. Thus:
r0 = r2k −Σ2kj=1d2k−i (mod v) = r2k − θ (mod v)
Consider the example of Anne’s vote again (illustrated in Figure 5). The form
she used to cast her vote had an offset of 2 and her X was in the second box,
value 1. Hence the initial value of r2k was 1 in her case. The tellers will in effect
compute:
r0 = r2k −
2k∑
j=1
di(mod 4) = 1− 2(mod 4) = 3
Thus the final r value r0 = 3 does indeed translate to a vote for “Buddhist”
in the base ordering. The encryption of the vote can thus be thought of as a
(co-variant) transformation of the frame of reference, decryption to the corre-
sponding (contra-variant) transformation.
The overall effect then, is to have posted on the bulletin board, in the left
hand column, the batch of initial receipts as posted by the voting devices. In the
right hand column we will have the fully decrypted votes. In between there will
be a set of columns with the intermediate, partially decrypted (r,D) pairs. Each
column will be some secret permutation of the previous one, and the permutation
will not be published. This is illustrated in Figure 6. Note that the decryptions at
each mix stage prevent the permutation being reconstructed by simple matching
of onions or r values.
Teller2 Teller1 Teller0
votesballots
An
An
Al
Al
Ni
Ni
Bu
Bun
X
X
Fig. 5. A vote processed by three tellers
Teller1Teller2 Teller0
votesballots
Fig. 6. Information posted by the sequence of three tellers
The purpose of using the hash of the germ values buried in the onion layers
to transform the r values is to foil guessing attacks on the mixes. Without
these hashes it would be possible to guess links through the mixes and check
the guess by performing the appropriate computations (with the knowledge of
the teller’s public keys). With the hash functions, these checks would require the
computation of pre-images of the hashes, thus rendering such attacks intractable.
We will see later that, for audited links the tellers are required to reveal not
only the link but also the associated germ. The computations performed by the
auditors are thus perfectly tractable.
Assuming that all the tellers perform their transformations correctly, there
will be a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of each column and
the next. The exact correspondence, which (r,D) pair in one column corresponds
to which pair in the next column, will be hidden and known only to the teller
who performed the transformation between those columns. Thus, the receipts
will have undergone multiple, secret shuffles between the first column as posted
by the voting devices and the final decrypted column. This ensures that no voter
can be linked to her vote, so ensuring ballot secrecy.
The fact that several tellers are used gives several layers of defence with re-
spect to voter privacy: even if several of the tellers, but not all, are compromised,
the linkage of voters with their votes will remain secret.
The decrypted votes are posted in the final column so the overall count can
be verified by anyone.
9 Checking on the Authority
The description so far has assumed that all the players: the authority, the voting
device and the tellers, have behaved correctly, i.e., in accordance with the rules
of the scheme. If we could be sure that everyone would obey the rules, we could
be sure that the election will be both accurate and private. However, should any
of these
players cheat, the accuracy and/or privacy would be undermined.
To have to place such dependence on the components runs counter to the
design philosophy of the scheme. In this section we discuss the checks that are
performed on the ballot forms provided by the authority. The following checks are
performed by the auditors and the voters themselves to provide assurance that
the forms are correctly constructed (and hence result in the correct decryption
of the votes).
Firstly, auditors select a random sample of forms to check. This can be done
before, during and after (on unused forms) the election period. For each selected
ballot form they perform the following mode 4 check:
– a digital copy of the onion is sent to the tellers.
– the tellers strip off the layers of encryption using their private keys to reveal
the germs.
– these germ values are returned to the auditors.
– given the germ values, and knowing the public keys of the tellers, the
auditors are able to reconstruct the value of the onion and can check that
this agrees with the value printed on the form.
– they now recompute the offset value as the (mod v) sum of the hashes of
the germs.
– they can now check that the offset applied to the candidate list shown on
the form agrees with the value obtained above.
If all these checks are successful, it is safe to conclude that the ballot form
in question was correctly constructed. Checked ballot forms, for which the seed
has been revealed, are then discarded.
Note that the algorithms for these checks are publicly known, so in principle,
anyone could construct such a checker and make it freely available. Similarly
anyone could examine such a checker to establish that it was performing cor-
rectly. Note also that any interested party could volunteer to perform some of the
auditing. Thus, for example, the Electoral Reform Society could act as auditors.
Representatives of the political parties could act as auditors. Furthermore, any
results produced by an auditor can be double checked by independent parties.
Besides these checks performed by the auditors, the voters get to perform
checks of their own on their dummy ballot forms. This serves as a further check
that the authority and tellers are behaving correctly, and should help promote
confidence in the electorate that their votes will count.
As noted earlier, care has to be taken in assessing the assurance provided by
the voter checks as these are vulnerable to collusion attacks. Various counter-
measures could be adopted to limit the likelihood of such collusions. One possi-
bility is to use an l out of k threshold scheme for the onion encryptions. The l
cardinality subsets of the k tellers could then be chosen randomly for the dummy
voting process. If the colluding tellers were omitted when a corrupted dummy
vote was decrypted, an error would be flagged.
In any case, the random audits should catch such manipulated ballot forms.
The auditor checks described earlier are not vulnerable to such collusion attacks
as they check directly the well-formedness of the ballot forms. The tellers might
return incorrect germ values but this will of course throw up a mismatch between
the recomputed onion value and the value on the form. It might be that a teller
malfunctions, or is loaded with the wrong keys. In this case the checks serve a
useful role in debugging such configuration errors.
Note that the encryptions are all bijective, hence the germ values are uniquely
determined by the onion value. The tellers cannot therefore find alternative germ
values that would give the same onion value but a different offset.
Together, these checks ensure that if a malicious or corrupted authority tried
to corrupt votes by providing a candidate ordering that does not correspond
to the seed information buried in the onion, they stand a high chance of being
detected. The chance of corruption going undetected falls off exponentially with
the number of ballots they try to corrupt.
10 Checking on the vote recording devices
We need to ensure that ballot receipts are faithfully transmitted and entered
into the tallying process. This is where the web bulletin board comes into play.
Once voting has closed, all ballot receipts should be posted to the bulletin board.
The material posted to the bulletin board should be publically available in read
only mode. Thus any voter can visit the board and confirm that their receipt
appears correctly in the input column.
If their receipt does not appear, or appears in corrupted form (in particular,
if the position of the X is incorrect), then this should be reported. The voter
has their receipt to prove to an official if their receipt does not appear correctly.
In practice all ballot forms would be printed on anti-counterfeiting paper and
would probably have a digital signature to prevent attempts to fake receipts.
Assuming that voters are reasonably diligent in performing these checks,
any failures to faithfully post receipts to the bulletin board, and hence to enter
them into the tallying, should be detected. Precautions would also be needed
to prevent anyone inserting additional, invalid receipts. One simple precaution
would be to ensure that the number of posted receipts matched the number of
cast ballots. Digital signatures applied by the voting devices could also be used
to help prevent fake ballots being introduced.
11 Checking on the Tellers
Checks must also be performed to detect any inaccuracy in the transformations
performed by the tellers on the real ballot receipts. That is, we need to detect
any attempt by the tellers to alter, remove, inject or corrupt votes.
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Fig. 7. Auditing Telleri
As in the original Chaum scheme, the auditing of the tellers is based on the
notion of partial random checking proposed in [4]. This takes place after the
teller processing has finished, and is applied to the information committed to by
the tellers on the web bulletin board.
For each teller an auditing authority goes down the middle column and ran-
domly assigns R or L to each (r,D) pair. For pairs assigned an R, the auditor
requires the teller to reveal the outgoing link (to the right) to the corresponding
pair in the next column along with the corresponding germ value. For all pairs
assigned an L, the auditor requires the teller to reveal the incoming link (from
the left) along with the germ value.
This way of selecting links ensures that, for any given teller, no complete
route across the two shuffles performed by that teller are revealed by the audit
process. Hence no ballot receipt can be traced across the two mixes performed by
any given teller. Each ballot transformation has a 50/50 chance of being audited.
This is illustrated in Figure 7, with the selected links included. The remaining
links are not revealed.
For each teller the auditor performs such a random audit. Given the property
that there are no full links revealed across any teller’s mixes, the L/R selection
can be made quite independently for each teller. This is the rationale for making
each teller perform two mixes.
Suppose that for a revealed link the pair has been transformed thus:
ri, Di −→ ri−1, Di−1
Knowing this and the corresponding germ value gi−1 (which the teller is
required to provide for each revealed link), it can be checked that the following
hold:
Di = {gi−1, Di−1}PKTi−1
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Fig. 8. Auditing the three tellers
and
ri−1 = ri − hash(gi−1)(mod v)
If these equalities hold on a link we can conclude that the teller executed the
correct transformation on this ballot pair. Some additional reasoning is required
to show that it is not possible for a teller to perform a corrupted mix and be
able to reveal false links in such a way as to pass any audit.
Figure 8 illustrates the audit across the sequence of three tellers.
12 Error Handling and Recovery Strategies
So far we have only described the checks that can be performed. A full description
of the scheme requires detailing error handling and recovery modes. Due to lack
of space we will not attempt to give an exhaustive description here.
Let us just consider the error handling strategy for a failed voter check. The
first step for the official is to confirm that there is a real disagreement. Anne will
have both parts of the dummy ballot form so she can prove which way she cast
her dummy vote and she has the printout for the tellers. The official can thus
establish that the problem is genuine and not just a case of voter error.
If the problem is real, the official should now run a further, mode 4 check: use
the tellers as an oracle to extract the seed value and use this value to reconstruct
the onion value and candidate list offset. If these values agree with those shown on
the ballot, then it is fair to conclude that the form was correctly constructed by
the authority. The error must then lie with the decryption of the vote performed
by the tellers.
If this check fails, it can mean one of two things: the form was incorrectly
constructed by the authority, or the form was perhaps actually correctly formed
but the seed value returned by the tellers is incorrect.
Clearly, errors have to be diagnosed and collated. Strategies for dealing with
patterns of errors must be specified. Thus, if a significant number of ballot forms
were found to be mal-formed, doubt would be cast on the integrity of the au-
thority charged with generating the forms. Note another pleasing feature of the
scheme: any significant corruption on the part of the authority generating the
ballot forms would almost certainly be detecting by random audits before the
election opens.
A full description of error handling and recovery strategies will be given in a
forthcoming paper.
13 Generalising ballots
This paper has so far considered ballots which allow a vote against a single
candidate. More generally, elections may allow votes or preferences to be cast
against a number of candidates. In this case a right hand strip may contain a
number of X ’s, or perhaps a list of numbers against candidates.
In this case, in order to avoid leaking information about votes, it is necessary
to allow any permutation of the candidate list on the left hand strip, rather than
just a cyclic permutation.
In order to achieve this, the germs could be used as keys for a cryptographic
permutation function. The overall permutation applied to the candidate list
as shown on the ballot form would then be a composition of the 2k separate
permutations obtained from the 2k germs.
We use a publically known hash function h that maps germs to permutations,
so that pi = h(gi) is a permutation of names on ballots. The overall permutation
is given by the composition of the permutations for all the germs:
π = p2k−1 ◦ p2k−1 ◦ . . . ◦ p0
(where f ◦ g(x) = f(g(x))). If the base candidate ordering is base, then the
candidate list on the ballot is given by π(base). Thus a corresponding vote r on
the right hand strip corresponds to a vote of π−1(r) against the base ordering.
The steps in the tellers take (ri+1, Di+1) to (ri, Di), where each step reverses
one permutation comprising π. Here, the r values will encode either a ranking or
an element of the power set of candidates as appropriate. The onion is unpeeled
as previously to extract the associated seed gi and the inner onion Di. In this
case the computation of ri is given by:
ri := (h(gi))−1(ri+1) = p−1i (ri+1)
Given the initial vote r provided to the tellers is the initial vote r2k, we obtain
that
ri = (p−1i ◦ p−1i+1 ◦ . . . ◦ p−12k−1)(r2k)
and thus the final vote r0 posted by Teller0 is π−1(r), which is indeed the vote
cast.
14 Related work and conclusions
A large number of cryptographic voting schemes have been proposed over the
past 20 or so years. These use a variety of cryptographic techniques, ranging from
blind signatures to cryptographic homomorphisms etc. The idea of providing
the voter with an encrypted receipt goes back the original scheme proposed by
Chaum. Another scheme, that also uses encrypted receipts and has similar goals,
is the VoteHere scheme of Adler and Neff, [5]. The cryptographic primitives used
there are quite different from those of this paper and appear to be significantly
more complex.
We have presented a new voter-verifiable election scheme based on the orig-
inal Chaum scheme. This variant preserves the essential features of the original
whilst sidestepping the complexity of the visual cryptography of the original.
The presentation of the encoding on the vote is quite intuitive and familiar. A
pleasing spin-off is that the randomisation of the candidate order counters any
tendency to bias the voter choice that might arise from a fixed order.
The new scheme provides some interesting advantages over previous variants:
– The format of the ballot forms and the process of casting a vote is quite
familiar.
– The cryptographic commitments are generated before the voter choices are
revealed, even before the election period starts.
– The vote recording devices do not learn the voter choices. This avoids the
possibility of such devices leaking this information.
– Voters get to perform some their own checks on the correct construction of
their dummy ballot forms. This should help instil confidence that their real
votes will ultimately be correctly decrypted during the tallying process.
– The checking performed by the voters is supplemented by audits performed
by various auditing agencies.
– The problem of storing and selectively revealing seed information is solved
by the novel use of the tellers during the voting period as oracles to reveal
the seeds for ballot forms used for auditing.
– Voters get to run their checks before casting their vote. This avoids some of
the messiness in the recovery mechanisms of earlier variants when a voter
discovers a mal-formed receipt after casting their vote.
Precautions need to be taken to prevent double voting. In particular, care
needs to be taken to ensure that ballot forms used for checking cannot be reused
to cast real votes. These details of such mechanisms will be discussed in a future
paper.
For the purposes of illustration we have described how the scheme can be
used for a single vote system, i.e., in which voters get to choose just one of a
set of options or candidates. Where voters can rank the candidates in order of
preference (or indeed where they can vote for more than one candidate), full
permutations in place of the simple cyclic shifts presented here. In practice, full
permutations would probably be used even for single selection elections.
15 Future Directions
The destruction of the left hand strips of the ballot forms is essential to prevent
coercion. An issue that requires careful consideration then is how to best enforce
the destruction and ensure that it is not possible for the voter to exit the booth
with both parts of the ballot form. Mechanical devices that enforce the destruc-
tion when the vote is cast are a possibility. Another interesting possibility is,
rather than trying to enforce destruction of this strip, to ensure that plenty of
dummy left hand strips are available in the booth. If a voter is threatened with
coercion they can simply select an appropriate strip that will keep the coercer
happy.
Another issue is that, as presented, the scheme entails the authority know-
ing the association of all onions and candidate lists. Thus, if the authority were
compromised, it could jeopardise the secrecy of the election. Various measures
can be envisaged to counter or at least minimise this risk. Ballot forms could be
generated in some distributed fashion using various sources of entropy. Alterna-
tively, ballot forms could be generated and printed on demand. An intriguing
possibility is to use entropy derived from the paper used to print the forms, for
example using optical fibres stirred into the paper during manufacture. Ballot
forms could be supplied in sealed envelopes to prevent the information being
garnered in transit. The problem remains that there is still a point at which the
onion and candidate list must be presented to the voter.
For the checking modes 1 though 3, the germ values do not have to be
revealed. This suggests the possibility of reusing a ”dummy” ballot form to cast
a real vote. This has the advantage that the form used for the real vote will
itself have been tested. Ballot forms could come equipped with two onion values,
both of which should yield the candidate ordering shown. One could be used
for checking, the other to cast the real vote. This possibility may however open
up vulnerabilities and would need to be subjected to careful analysis. We will
pursue this in a forthcoming paper.
This scheme would appear to be readily adapted to remote voting. The sim-
plest adoption is to distribute ballot forms by post. Votes could then be cast by
providing the onion value along with suitable indicators of the voter selection
in the right hand column. Alternatively, protocols could be used for on-line, au-
thenticated distribution of the crypto material. Of course, the threat of coercion
that plagues remote voting systems rears its head again, but there may be ways
to offset this.
These avenues are the subject of current research.
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